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Abstract: From a methodological point of view, this paper makes two contributions to the literature. One 
contribution is the proposal of a new measure of pro-poor growth. This new measure provides the linkage 
between growth rates in mean income and in income inequality. In this context, growth is defined as pro-
poor  (or  anti-poor)  if  there  is  a  gain  (or  loss)  in  the  growth  rate  due  to  a  decrease  (or  increase)  in 
inequality. The other contribution is a decomposition methodology that explores linkages between growth 
patterns and social policies. Through the decomposition analysis, we assess the contribution of different 
income  sources  to  growth  patterns.  The  proposed  methodologies  are  then  applied  to  the  Brazilian 
National Household Survey (PNAD) covering the period 1995-2004. The paper analyzes the evolution of 
Brazilian  social  indicators  based  on  per  capita  income  exploring  links  with  adverse  labour  market 
performance  and  social  policy  change,  with  particular  emphasis  on  the  expansion  of  targeted  cash 
transfers and devising more pro-poor social security benefits.    
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Resumo:  Este  artigo  faz  duas  importantes  contribuições  metodológicas  para  a  literatura.  Uma 
contribuição é  a proposta de uma nova medida  do crescimento pró-pobre, no sentido de  aumentar a 
ponderação daqueles com menor renda. Esta nova medida permite uma ligação direta entre as taxas de 
crescimento na renda média e na desigualdade de renda em termos de mudancas de bem estar. Neste 
contexto, o crescimento é definido como pró-pobre (ou antipobre) se existir um ganho (ou perda) na taxa 
de crescimento de bem estar social devido a um aumento (ou uma queda) na desigualdade. A outra 
contribuição  é  uma  metodologia  de  decomposição  da  contribuição  de  diferentes  fontes  de  renda  do 
mercado de trabalho e mudanças nas políticas sociais expressas na unidade de medida que interessa, qual 
seja mudanças de bem estar social. As metodologias utilizadas são aplicadas a Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) analisando a evolução dos indicadores sociais brasileiros baseados na 
renda per capita de 1995 até 2004, explorando ligações com inovações observadas nas políticas sociais, 
especial ênfase na expansão de programas focalizados e condicionados de transferência de renda e do 
desenho de benefícios previdenciários mais voltados aos de menor renda. 
Palavras-Chave: Desigualdade, Pobreza, Crescimento Pró-Pobre, Política Social  
Area: Economia Social e Demografia Econômica 
JEL: D31; I32; N36; O15; J21; I38 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The Brazilian experience has been quite peculiar in the sense that structural reforms, and in particular 
trade liberalization, started comparatively late, only a few years ago. Whereas other countries in Latin 
America started opening their economies in the early or mid-1980s, the same process started in Brazil 
only in the early 1990s. The same happened with inflation control:  while Mexico started its stabilization 
process in the mid-80s and Argentina in the early 1990s, Brazil achieved successful price stabilization 
only after 1994. 
 
Brazil is the country in the world that presented the highest inflation in the period 1960-1995. From at 
least the beginning of the 1980s, curbing inflation became the focus of public policy in Brazil. Successive 
macroeconomic  packages  and  three  major  stabilization  efforts  have  been  attempted  since  then:  the 
Cruzado Plan in 1986, the Collor Plan in 1990 and the Real Plan in 1994. Only the Real Plan was 
successful in bringing down and controlling inflation.  The Real plan belongs to the ‘exchange-rate based 
stabilization’ type of plans that led to consumption booms instead of recessions but the need to support an 
overvalued exchange rate for stabilization purposes increased the fragility of the Brazilian economy to the 
waves of external shocks that hit it such as Mexican (1995), Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) crises.  
 
The  1999  Brazilian  devaluation  crisis  triggered  important  changes  in  the  macroeconomic  and  social 
policies  that  can be  still  observed  today,  such  as:  i)  the  adoption  of  floating  exchange  rates;  ii)  the 
adoption  of  inflation  targets;  iii)  the  implementation  of  the  Fiscal  Responsibility  Law  binding  all 
government levels and state enterprises alike
1 but with an increase in the size of the tax burden of about 
10 percentage points of GDP from 1995 onwards, reaching around 38 percent in the end of 2005.  One 
also has to bear in mind that there was very high real interest rates and an expansion of public expenditure 
that contributed to the rise in the Brazilian public debt that reached more than 50 percent of GDP and to 
the slow growth trend assumed. 
 
On the social front, minimum wages rose 75 percent in real terms from the beginning of 1995 to 2004 – 
and 100 percent until 2006. The minimum wage is also the numéraire of several cash transfers policies 
indexing benefits and eligibility criteria, in particular social security benefits. In 1995, social security 
expenditure already accounted for 50 percent of Brazilian social expenditure and 11 percent of GDP.  In 
1998, there was a change in social security income policies with progressive benefits adjustments but it 
was not particularly noticed because it did not require any reform or constitutional change. From 2000 
onwards, with the creation of the Poverty Eradication Fund, there was gradual adoption of programmes 
emanating from central government to municipalities which had lower Human Development Index levels. 
The expansion of targeted and conditional cash transfers such as the Bolsa-Escola, and now the Bolsa 
Família, aimed to combine compensatory and structural components. The availability and expansion of 
safety nets from 2001 onwards generated a pro-poor impact in many instances. The social effects of the 
new generation of income policies were not fully assessed because changes in social security benefit 
passed largely unnoticed and the diffusion of targeted cash transfers was gradual and relatively recent.  
 
During the last 25 years, changes in social indicators based on per capita income such as inequality, 
poverty  and  social  welfare  have  reflected  the  marked  volatility  of  the  Brazilian  macroeconomic 
environment:  until  1994  the  source  of  instability  was  the  rise  and  failure  of  successive  stabilization 
                                                 
♣ This paper is written for a keynote address at the 5th General Meeting of the Poverty and Economic Policy Research 
Network, which was held in June 18-22, 2006 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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attempts, while from 1995 onwards the main source of instability was the arrival (and the departure) of 
external crisis, but at the same time increasingly expanding and targeted cash transfers cushioned the 
social consequences of the high instability and low growth trends observed. 
 
As is generally claimed, there is a strong association between growth and poverty reduction in Brazil. 
Whether growth translates into significant poverty reduction depends upon numerous factors such as 
inflation,  external  shocks,  unemployment,  minimum  wages,  social programmes  etc.  One  of  the  most 
important factors influenced by all others is the degree of inequality in the country. Studies have found 
that poverty is more responsive to growth when the distribution of income and assets is more equal. In 
this context, a more equal society will grow faster. Brazil has been notoriously known as one of the 
countries with the highest income inequality in the world (DFID 2003, Li et al 1998, Psacharopoulos 
1991). After its steep rise in the 1960s, Brazilian income inequality has been high and stable between 
1970 and 2000 (Langoni 1973, Bacha and Taylor 1978, Hoffman 1989, Bonelli et al. 1989, Barros et al. 
1992, Ramos 1993, Barros et al. 2000). In recent years, however, inequality has been on the decline. High 
inequality in the country would have prevented the economy from growing faster. It is imperative to 
emphasize that a combination of economic growth and income distribution would lead to a more rapid 
and effective solution to poverty reduction. 
 
This paper proposes and applies to Brazil a growth and a pro-poor growth account methodology that 
explains how intense and regressive were the changes observed in different income sources found in the 
Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), with particular emphasis on social security benefits and 
conditional cash transfers. We calculate the ratio between the additional fiscal cost and the benefit in 
terms of pro-poor growth of expanding the main public cash transfer programmes in the period studied at. 
The final objective is to reveal the contribution of each income component discussed above to total per 
capita growth and to pro-poor growth. 
 
We focus our empirical analysis on the period of relative price stability but frequent external crisis from 
1995 to 2004, whose results – we believe - are more structural, less explored in the literature and more 
reliable. The deflation process of nominal incomes during a sharp inflationary transition such as those 
frequently observed before 1995 is rather complex and uncertain, the choice of specific price indexes and 
associated weights and lags involves arbitrary decisions that affect the average level of real incomes. 
Since incomes are nominally adjusted, received and spent at different moments, inflation also affects 
inequality measures in spurious ways. In other words, it is not only causality that explains the coincidence 
between the peaks of inflation and inequality that happened in Brazil in 1989 and 1994 but measurement 
error as well.  
 
The period starting in 1995 misses out the labour market boom and poverty reduction that were both 
observed after the Real plan stabilization. On the other hand, it captures the income inequality reduction 
of the 2001-2004 period which brought Brazilian inequality to its lowest levels in the last 25 years. After 
the peak of the so-called unemployment crisis of the second half of the nineties, there was some recovery 
of the labour market, specifically in terms of formal employment. The role played by different labour 
market variables on changes observed in the level and distribution of per capita income will be studied 
later in this paper. Another key factor to be studied is the adoption and expansion of a new regime of 
income policies - without dismantling the old regime - based on the expansion of new targeted cash 
transfer programmes financed by the central government. 
 
This paper is organized in the following manner. Section II is devoted to the derivation of pro-poor 
growth rate that adjusts for inequality. Section III outlines empirical aspects of calculating the pro-poor 
growth rate using household surveys. Section IV develops a decomposition methodology to link pro-poor 
growth with labour market characteristics. While section V describes trends in growth, inequality and 
poverty, section VI discusses economic, institutional and social fluctuations in Brazil. Sections VII and 
VIII present the empirical results for pro-poor growth rates and the decomposition method, respectively.   3 
Based on a Shapely decomposition, section IX looks at the contribution of main components to growth 
patterns. Similarly, section X investigates the contributions of different non-labour income sources to 
growth. While section XI discusses demographic trends in Brazilian society, section XII concludes the 
study.     
 
II.  Pro-poor growth rate   
 
Suppose x is the real income of an individual, which is a random variable with density function f(x), then 
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A county’s performance in average standard of living can be measured by the growth rate γ  given by 
 
) (  γ Ln   =                                                            (2) 
 
Economic growth has an impact on each individual in a different manner. Following Kakwani and Pernia 
(2000),  growth  can  be  defined  as  pro-poor  (or  anti-poor)  if  the  benefits  of  growth  go  to  the  poor 
proportionally more (or less) than to the non-poor. Thus, a pro-poor growth decreases inequality whereas 
an anti-poor growth increases inequality. The pattern of growth can be described by two factors: (i) the 
growth rate in mean income defined by  γ  and (ii) how inequality  changes over time. To  formulate 
poverty reduction policies, it is important to look at the distributive pattern of economic growth and not 
just at the growth rate in mean income. 
 
To understand the pattern of economic growth, we have to link economic growth with changes in income 
distribution. To achieve this objective, we need to specify a social welfare function, which gives a greater 
weight to utility enjoyed by the poor compared to utility enjoyed by the non-poor. Suppose u(x) is the 
utility function, which is increasing in x and concave, then we can define a general class of social welfare 
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where w(x) is the weight given to the utility of the individual with income x. The main problem with this 
social welfare function is that it is not invariant to the positive linear transformation of the utility function. 
Following Atkinson’s (1970) idea of equally distributed equivalent level of income, we can get a money-
metric social welfare function denoted by x
* from (3) as        
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*                                                            (4) 
where x
*  is the equally distributed equivalent level of income which, if given to every individual in the 
society results in the same social welfare level as the actual distribution of income.     
 
To make pro-poor growth operational, we need to specify u(x) and w(x). The most popular form of the 
utility function is the logarithmic utility function which, given by u(x) = log(x), is increasing and concave 
in x. In this study we adopt the logarithmic utility function not only because of its popularity but also 
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because of its attractive features such as decomposability of growth rate in terms of some labour market 
characteristics. We will discuss this decomposition methodology in the next section.  
 
The weighting function w(x) should capture the relative deprivation that is suffered by the poor relative to 
the non-poor in society; the greater the deprivation suffered by an individual with income x, the greater 
should  be  w(x).  Thus,  w(x)  should  be  a  decreasing  function  of  x.  Further,  total  weight  given  to  all 
individuals should add up to unity, which implies 
 
0
( ) ( ) 1 w x f x dx
∞
= ∫                                                                  (5)  
 
 A simple way to capture relative deprivation is to assume that an individual’s deprivation depends on the 
number of persons who are better off than him/her in society. Such a weighting scheme is given by  
 
( ) 2[1 ( )] w x F x = −                                                                (6) 
  
where F(x) is the distribution function. This function implies that the relative deprivation suffered by an 
individual  with  income  x  is  proportional  to  the  proportion  of  individuals  who  are  richer  than  this 
individual. It can be verified that w(x) in (6) is a decreasing function of x and satisfies equation (5).
3 
 
Substituting u(x) = log(x) and w(x) from (6) in (4) gives the social welfare function: 
 
0
log( *) 2 [1 ( )]log( ) ( ) x F x x f x dx
∞
= − ∫                                  (7) 
  
which provides the basis for empirical analysis presented in this paper. It will be useful to write (7) as  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) I log log x log
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where I is a new measure of inequality. Taking first difference in (8) gives  
 
* g γ γ = −                                                                            (10) 
   
where  ( )
* * x log   = γ  is the growth rate of money-metric social welfare x
*,   log( ) γ   =    is the growth rate 
of mean income     and  log( ) g I =   is the growth rate of inequality as measured by I. This equation 
describes a growth pattern which provides the linkage between growth rates in the mean income and 
income inequality.   
 
* γ  is the proposed measure of pro-poor growth rate. If g is positive, then growth is accompanied by an 
increase in inequality. In this case, we have  γ γ <
*  and thus, there is a loss of growth rate due to the 
increase  in  inequality.  If  g  is  negative,  this  implies  that  growth  is  accompanied  by  a  decrease  in 
                                                 
3 Note that this weighting scheme is also implicit in the Gini index, which is the most popular measure of inequality.   5 
inequality. In this case,  γ γ >
* , which suggests that there is a gain in growth rate due to the decrease in 
inequality. Growth is defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in growth rate.    
 
III.  Calculating pro-poor growth rate from household surveys 
 
This  study  utilizes  the  Pesquisa  Nacional  por  Amostra  de  Domicilios  (PNAD,  the  Brazilian  Annual 
National Household Survey) from 1995 to 2004. Each household survey contains a variable called the 
weighting coefficient (WTA), which is the number of population households represented by each sample 
household. The sum of the WTAs for all sample households provides the total number of households in 
the  country.  A  population  weight  variable  (POP)  can  be  constructed  by  multiplying  the  weighting 
coefficient (WTA) by the household size. The sum total of the (POP) variable for all sample households 
provides an estimate of the total population in the country. The total population estimate for Brazil was 
calculated as equal to 148.11 million for 1995, which increased to 173.71 million in 2004.  
 
Using the (POP) variable, one can easily calculate the relative frequency that is associated with every 
sample household. Suppose fit is the relative frequency associated with the ith household at year t. If xit is 
the per capita real income of the ith household at year t, then the mean income of all individuals in the 
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which was estimated for every year between 1995 and 2004. We then estimate the growth rate of the 
mean income at year t as 
 
log( ) t t γ   =                                                            (12) 
 
To compute the social welfare function defined in (7), we need an estimate of the probability distribution 
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when households are arranged in ascending order of their per capita real income  it x . Substituting (13) into 
(7) gives a consistent estimate of money-metric social welfare 
*




log( ) 2 (1 )log
n
t it it it
i
x f p x
=
= − ∑                        (14) 
 
which gives an estimate of pro-poor growth rate at year t as 
 
* * log( ) t t x γ =                                                   (15) 
 
Growth will be pro-poor (anti-poor) at year t if 
*
t γ is greater (less) than t γ . 
 
                                                 
4 This equation makes a continuity correction, which is estimated by obtaining an unbiased estimate of F(x).   6 
 
IV.  Trends in Growth, Inequality and Poverty  
 
For this study, we have chosen per capita real income as a welfare indicator. Per capita real income is 
defined  as  per  capita  nominal  income  adjusted  for  prices,  which  vary  across  regions  and  over  time 
(Ferreira et al. 2003).  Per capita real income and money-metric social welfare shows a sharp disparity 
between both variables per capita real mean income and per capita social welfare reflects a high level of 
inequality in Brazil over the period.  However, the good news is that the disparity between the two 
indicators has narrowed in the recent years. This indicates a fall in inequality in Brazil over the past years.  
Table 1 presents growth rates of per capita real income and per capita social welfare. The results reveal 
that the trend in per capita real income has been declining at an annual rate of 0.63 percent over 1995-
2004. Hence, the actual growth rate of per capita real income has been almost stagnant. This unimpressive 
performance in per capita real income worsened even further in the second period 2001-2004, when per 
capita real income fell at an annual rate of 1.35 percent.  
 
Table 1: Growth rates of per capita real income and social welfare 
Period  Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate 
Gain(+)/loss(-) of 
growth 
1995-96  1.59  -5.95  -7.54 
1996-97  0.65  4.42  3.77 
1997-98  0.97  5.07  4.10 
1998-99  -5.15  -2.53  2.63 
1999-2001  0.76  -2.17  -2.94 
2001-2002  0.11  8.98  8.87 
2002-2003  -6.12  -9.64  -3.52 
2003-2004  3.56  14.11  10.55 
1995-2004  -0.63  0.73  1.36 
1995-2001  -0.30  0.10  0.40 
2001-2004  -1.35  3.07  4.42 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
Figure 1: Growth rates of per capita real income and social welfare 
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This pessimistic picture, however, tends to disappear if growth is evaluated in terms of social welfare 
adjusted for inequality, which is called the pro-poor growth rate in the table. This is a more relevant 
concept for evaluating a country’s performance in relation to its standard of living. In the first period   7 
(1995-2001),  the  trend  in  the  pro-poor  growth  rate,  although  positive,  was  only  0.10  percent,  which 
cannot be regarded as a good performance but the trend in the growth rate in the second period (2001-
2004) increased to 3.07 percent, which is an exceptionally good performance.  
 
The last column of Table 1 is obtained by subtracting the actual growth rate from the pro-poor growth 
rate. Gains in growth rates imply a decline in inequality, while losses in growth rates imply an increase in 
inequality. Substantial gains in growth rates are quite noticeable in the second period, 2001-2004. There 
have been gains in growth rates equivalent to 4.42 percent per annum because of falling inequality in the 
2000s. By contrast, the gains had been merely 0.40 percent per year in the first period, 1995-2001. Thus, 
in the second period, the poor were able to benefit proportionally much more from growth than in the first 
period. This growth pattern has led to an unprecedented reduction in inequality in Brazil. 
 
All  in  all,  the  Brazilian  experience  exhibits  an  interesting  pattern  between  growth  in  per  capita  real 
income and poverty: while per capita real income has declined over the period, poverty has also fallen. 
This is an interesting case that does not support a priori the notion that a positive (or negative) growth 
leads to a decrease (or increase) in poverty. More importantly, the negative growth during the period, 
1995-2004, was pro-poor in the sense that the poor made positive gains in their incomes despite the fact 
that average incomes declined. Thus, there was a sharp decline in inequality over the period which offset 
the adverse effect of the negative growth on poverty. 
 
V.  Contribution of Income Sources to Growth  
 
The separation of per capita total income into labour and non-labour components allows us to capture the 
main sources of the total growth patterns assumed. As we have previously seen for the 1995-2004 period, 
total income average growth was -0.63 percent while labour income grew at an average rate of -1.49 
percent; and, non-labour income grew at an average rate of 2.64 per annum. However, in order to see the 
contribution  of  different  income  sources  to  total  income  -  as  we  have  done  for  the  labour  market 
components - it is not sufficient to gauge the growth rates of different component ratios, but also to take 
into account the relative weights of each income source in total income. This point also applies to pro-
poor  growth and to the inequality  aspects of social welfare.   The interaction between the high non-
linearity of these last two concepts and the additive nature of income sources create some difficulties. As 
a result, a Shapely decomposition was used to obtain each income source contribution to pro-poor growth, 
which is explained in the Appendix. In general, the contribution of a given source to the total growth of a 
particular social welfare concept is positively related to its initial weight and to its relative rate of growth 
in the same period. In Table 2, we present the rates of growth and the contributions to the rates of growth 
of total income, together with its labour and non-labour components. 
 
In 1995, labour income amounted to 82.1 percent of total income, while the remaining 17.9 percent 
referred to non-labour. However, the main sources of growth, and in particular pro-poor growth sources, 
relied on the latter. As shown in Table 2, the fall of total income of -0.63 percent per year in the overall 
1995-2004 period can be decomposed into the adverse labour income contribution of -1.17 percent per 
year and the contribution of non-labour income of 0.54 percent per year.   
 
   8 
Table 2: Growth rates and contributions to growth by income components 















1995-2004  -1.49  0.86  -0.63  -1.17  0.54  -0.63 
1995-2001  -1.30  1.00  -0.30  -1.02  0.72  -0.30 
2001-2004  -2.05  0.70  -1.35  -1.59  0.24  -1.35 
Pro-poor growth 
1995-2004  -0.73  1.46  0.73  -0.60  1.33  0.73 
1995-2001  -0.97  1.07  0.10  -0.74  0.84  0.10 
2001-2004  0.97  2.10  3.07  0.61  2.46  3.07 
Inequality 
1995-2004  0.76  0.60  1.36  0.57  0.79  1.36 
1995-2001  0.32  0.08  0.40  0.28  0.12  0.40 
2001-2004  3.02  1.40  4.42  2.20  2.22  4.42 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
 
In turn, differences in pro-poor average annual growth rates are somewhat smaller as can be seen from 
Table 2: total social welfare increased 0.73 percent; labour income declined by 0.73 percent and non-
labour income increased by 1.46 percent. The weight of labour income in social welfare in the initial 
period  1995  was  83.9  percent,  which  is  even  higher  than  in  the  case  of  average  total  incomes.  Its 
contribution to total social welfare growth in the whole period was -0.60 percent per annum, i.e. about 
half of its contribution to average income growth.  Conversely, non-labour income’s share of the social 
welfare growth was 1.33 percent per year, making it an important factor in determining the positive social 
welfare trend assumed in the 1995-2004 period. 
 
Focusing on individual periods, the contribution of labour income to average annual growth changed from 
-1.02 percent in 1995-2001 to -1.59 percent in 2001-04. The track record of labour income’s contribution 
to pro-poor growth is better than its contribution to growth per se: -0.74 percent in 1995-2001 and 0.61 
percent in 2001-04.  Likewise, non-labour’s income share of pro-poor growth also surpasses its effects on 
average income growth in both periods. Note that from 1995 to 2001, non-labour’s income impact on pro-
poor growth rose from 0.84 percent per year to 2.46 percent per year in the 2001-2004 period. 
 
Both labour and non-labour incomes have contributed to a decline in total inequality. During the 1995-
2001 period, it was the labour income that had a higher contribution to the inequality reduction: 0.28 and 
0.12 percent due to the labour and non-labour income, respectively. In total, the reduction in inequality 
amounts to a gain in growth rate by only 0.40 percent. In the second period (2001-04), the gain in growth 
rate due to a fall in inequality was 4.42 percent, which is substantially greater than the corresponding 
figure for the first period (1995-2001). Of the gain of 4.42 percent, 2.20 percent was contributed by the 
labour income and 2.22 percent by the non-labour income. Thus, the contribution of non-labour income to 
the inequality reduction was slightly higher than that of labour income despite the fact that the share of 
labour in total income was much higher than that of non-labour income. This suggests that the non-labour 
income has been more pro-poor than the labour income in the second period.  
    9 
 
VI.  Decomposing the Contribution of Non-Labour Incomes 
 
This section aims to assess the contribution of different types of non-labour income sources to the total 
growth of different welfare concepts, through a decomposition scheme of these income sources impacts.  
 
Special attention is paid to incomes mostly directly affected by social policies, such as social security 
benefits and other non-labour income sources that include cash transfers from social programmes and 
capital income - which turns out to be underestimated in PNAD data.  The remaining sources of non-
labour income such as rents and private transfers (remittances, donations, child maintenance support, etc) 
are part of what is called non-social income. 
 













  Actual growth 
1995-2004  -1.49  3.25  5.77  -2.43  -0.63 
1995-2001  -1.30  4.69  0.73  -1.23  -0.30 
2001-2004  -2.05  0.86  13.26  -3.69  -1.35 
  Pro-poor growth 
1995-2004  -0.73  3.12  29.94  1.43  0.73 
1995-2001  -0.97  2.56  25.50  4.41  0.10 
2001-2004  0.97  3.90  35.21  -1.97  3.07 
  Inequality 
1995-2004  0.76  -0.13  24.17  3.86  1.36 
1995-2001  0.32  -2.13  24.77  5.64  0.40 
2001-2004  3.02  3.04  21.94  1.72  4.42 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
Table 3 presents trends in growth rates by non-labour income components. The results reveal that while 
social security has contributed to a rise in inequality during the 1995-2004 period, the others – including 
other non-labour income and non-social income – have been attributed to a fall in inequality during the 
same period. Interestingly, in the 2001-04 period all three non-labour income components made a positive 
contribution to the reduction in inequality.   
 
Table 4 explains the net contributions of each non-labour income component to growth patterns and 
inequality reduction. The results are obtained from the Shapely decomposition method (see Appendix). 
According to the table, other non-labour income has been the dominant net contributor to a reduction in 
inequality over the decade 1995-2004. Its net contribution is particularly high in the latter period 2001-04. 
While non-social income appears to play a smaller role in reducing inequality, the net impact of social 
security has been quite important. During the first period (1995-2001), the net effect of social security 
resulted  in  an  increase  in  inequality.  Its  net  contribution  on  inequality  was  greater  than  the  net 
contributions by the other two components. Nevertheless, the sum of net contributions by the other two 
sources had offset the net contribution by social security. As a result, inequality of the non-labour income 
in the first period showed a slight fall by 0.12 percent. 
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Table 4: Explaining contributions of growth rates by non-labour income components 













  Actual growth 
1995-2004  -1.17  0.54  0.06  -0.07  -0.63 
1995-2001  -1.02  0.75  0.01  -0.04  -0.30 
2001-2004  -1.59  0.17  0.16  -0.10  -1.35 
  Pro-poor growth 
1995-2004  -0.60  0.40  0.88  0.04  0.73 
1995-2001  -0.74  0.34  0.38  0.12  0.10 
2001-2004  0.61  0.48  2.00  -0.03  3.07 
  Inequality 
1995-2004  0.57  -0.14  0.82  0.11  1.36 
1995-2001  0.28  -0.41  0.37  0.16  0.40 
2001-2004  2.20  0.31  1.84  0.07  4.42 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
 
VI.1  Non-Social Income 
 
Non-social income fell at an average rate of -2.43 percent per year in the 1995-2004 period, but it had a 
sharper decrease in the second period (-3.69 percent) than the rate of -1.23 percent per year observed in 
the first period (Table 2). In spite of the negative growth, non-social income has contributed to a fall in 
inequality over the decade. Its effect on the inequality reduction had been much greater in the first period 
compared to the second period; 5.64 percent (in 1995-2001) against 1.72 percent (in 2001-04).  
 
Nevertheless, the net contribution of non-social income to overall growth performance was rather small 
given its growth rates. As shown in Table 16, the net effect of non-social income on inequality reduction 
was just 0.11 percent between 1995-2004; its magnitude fell to 0.07 percent in the 2001-04 period from 
0.16 percent in the 1995-2001 period. 
 
VI.2  Social Security Benefits 
 
Social security is the main component of social income in Brazil, and second only to labour earnings 
among all income sources collected by PNAD. In 2004, it amounted 19.55 percent of all income sources 
and 92.5 percent of social income. Social security benefits information includes a contributory Pay as 
You Go system and non contributory benefits, both subject to discretionary income policies from the 
government. The average growth rate of per capita social security benefits was 3.25 percent per year from 
1995 to 2004 (Table 2). The average growth rate of social security in the first period was much higher 
than in the second period, 4.69 percent against 0.86 percent. However, rapid growth in social security has 
resulted in an increase in inequality in Brazil over the 1995-2004 period. Its adverse impact amounted to 
an increase of inequality by 2.13 percent in the first period. Yet the impact of social security income on 
inequality was reversed when its growth slowed down: it led to a reduction in inequality by 3.04 percent 
in the second period. A similar story emerges from the results reported in Table 4.  
 
Given the dominance of the public transfer aspect in this income aggregate, it is useful to observe the 
ratio of pro-poor growth to total growth contribution. This can be interpreted as an elasticity that shows   11 
how many public resources (measured by their share of total income) are translated into social welfare, a 
type of cost-benefit analysis. The corresponding elasticity of pro-poor growth with respect to total growth 
(i.e. its fiscal cost) both explained by social security rose from 0.45 in the 1995-2001 period to 2.82 in 
2001-2004, demonstrating a marked improvement in the ability of social security benefits targeting the 
poorest segments of Brazilian society.
5 After 1998 the government adopted the new policy of setting 
higher adjustment rates to lower social security benefits. In the entire 1995-2004 period, this elasticity 
amounts to be 0.74. This elasticity allows comparing to what extent different types of public transfers 
reach the poor. 
 
VI.3  Other Non-labour Income 
 
Other non-labour income sources include very different types of incomes, ranging from cash transfer 
programmes such as the Bolsa-Família to capital income such as flows derived from interest rates paid on 
government debt. The pro-poorness aspects of these items are expected to be very different, despite the 
fact that both are not only subject to public policy choices but are mostly mediated by the state
6, as well. 
Interest income is largely underestimated by PNAD data, hence this income concept is largely explained 
by public cash transfer programmes such as Bolsa-Família. 
 
According to Table 3, the other sources of non-labour income aggregate have grown at an annual rate of 
5.77 percent in the whole period from 1995 to 2004, presenting very diverse patterns across sub-periods. 
They increased on average 0.73 percent in the first period 1995-2001, but this growth has accelerated 
considerably in the 2001-2004 period to 13.26 percent, reflecting the expansion of the conditional cash 
transfer programmes.  
 
Table 3 also assesses the impact of other non-labour income source on inequality reduction. This income 
source has attributed to a reduction in inequality by 24.17 percent per year in the 1995-2004 period. This 
favourable effect on inequality can be explained by the fact that cash is aimed at the poorest sectors of the 
population. The effect on inequality reduction of this income component has reduced to some extent, 
falling  from  24.77  percent  in  the  1995-2001  period  to  21.95  percent  in  the  2001-2004  period.  This 
suggests that the impact of cash transfers has become slightly less pro-poor in the second period. 
 
As we have seen, to measure the contribution of the expansion of cash transfer programmes from 2001 
onwards, it is not sufficient to gauge its relatively high growth rates. Instead, its relative weight among 
different non-labour income sources must also be considered. In Table 16, the net contribution of other 
non-labour income to total growth per year during the 1995-2004, 1995-2001 and 2001-2004 periods was 
0.06, 0.01 and 0.16, respectively. This means that the role of cash transfers to explain income growth is 
quite small. But by the same token, the impacts of other income sources on the fiscal budget deficit were 
also relatively mild.  
 
According to Table 4, the net contribution of other non-labour income source to inequality reduction 
outweighs the contributions made by the other two income components. In the overall 1995-2004 period, 
it was responsible for 0.82 percent of the fall in inequality. Similarly, its net contribution was 0.37 percent 
of the fall in inequality in the 1995-2001 period and then increased to 1.84 percent of the inequality fall. 
This indicates that other non-labour income sources constitute a key determinant of the reduction in 
inequality in Brazil over the period.  
 
                                                 
5 One possibility  is to divide the information on social security benefits in two regimes: one  with benefits equal to one 
minimum wage, the constitutional floor, and the rest. Neri (1998, 2001) followed this approach and showed that around 60% of 
social security benefits amounted to one minimum wage while 80% of social security income accrued to benefits above this 
level. Each additional real spent adjusting the social security benefits floor resulted in 4.5 times more poverty reduction than a 
uniform adjustment to all benefits. 
6 The public debt is the main source of interest gains earned by Brazilian households.   12 
The elasticity of the  contribution to pro-poor  growth of  a particular income transfer with respect its 
contribution  to  total  growth  is  useful  to  guide  policies  aimed  at  the  poorest  groups  in  the  Brazilian 
society. The corresponding other non-labour income sources elasticity was 14.66 during the 1995-2004 
period which is much higher than the one found for social security benefits. Each percentage point in the 
share of government transfers in this item bought 19.8 times more pro poor growth in other non-labour 
income than in social security benefits, this is result is consistent with the evaluation of codional cash 
transfers done in Brazil and elsewhere (Lindert et al. 2005, Barros 2005, Hoffman 2005, Soares 2006, 
Bourguignon et al. 2003, Skoufias et al. 2001, Coady et al. 2004, Suplicy 2002).
7  
 
In  sum,  other  non-labour  income  sources  have  played  a  dominant  role  in  pro-poor  growth  pattern 
assumed while having a minor contribution to total growth and to the Brazilian fiscal accounts. It seems 
that a small increase in government cash transfers programmes had a high impact on poor people’s living 
conditions. 
 
VII.  Demographic Trends 
 
The main transfers in terms of social income such as social security and cash transfers are aimed at 
specific age groups. Social security benefits attempt in principle to smooth living conditions specifically 
in the old age, while the new generation of cash transfer programmes in Brazil is mostly focused on 
children and teenagers. Labour income is also predominantly earned by non-elderly adults. There are 
however exceptions for cash transfers programmes included in the other source of non-labour income that 
attempt to provide income to other age groups such as the continuous assistance benefit (BPC) for the old 
and the disabled or unemployment insurance that benefits mostly adults. Non-social income accrues to 
individuals in very diverse age groups. To make things more complex, these programs are mixed in 
different income concepts. One way to check the levels and trends of how total incomes affect different 
age groups in different ranks of the society is to compare per capita growth rates of these groups in the 
population with their respective pro-poor growth rates.   
 
We have divided the population in three age groups and calculated the levels and trends of the following 
variables: 
-  Per capita children and young teenagers in household, aged between 0 and 15 years. 
-  Per capita adults in household, aged 16-64 years. 
-  Per capita elderly in household, aged from 65 years and over. 
 
                                                 
7 The cash transfer elasticity of pro poor growth decreased from 38 in the 1995-2001 period to 12.5 percent in 2001-2004, 
showing a loss in the pro-poorness of cash transfers but in the last period it is still 4.43 higher than the value the elasticity 
found for social security benefits.   13 
Table 5: Demographic trends (%) 


















1995  0.347  0.596  0.057  0.393  0.541  0.036 
1996  0.337  0.605  0.058  0.382  0.551  0.040 
1997  0.333  0.608  0.059  0.378  0.554  0.039 
1998  0.325  0.615  0.060  0.372  0.560  0.037 
1999  0.318  0.620  0.062  0.365  0.567  0.036 
2001  0.309  0.630  0.062  0.356  0.576  0.033 
2002  0.301  0.635  0.064  0.348  0.582  0.035 
2003  0.294  0.640  0.066  0.341  0.588  0.042 
2004  0.290  0.643  0.067  0.338  0.591  0.034 
Trend 1995-2004  -1.96  0.83  1.66  -1.64  0.96  -0.67 
Trend 1995-2001  -1.94  0.90  1.37  -1.60  1.00  -2.03 
Trend 2001-2004  -2.05  0.70  2.59  -1.81  0.90  2.31 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
 
Table 5 shows that in 1995, children and young teenagers group represented 34.7 percent in average 
household and the corresponding figure goes up to 39.3 percent when we use the inequality-adjusted 
weighting scheme. This implies that it is more likely to find a child in the lowest per capita income ranks 
of Brazilian society than elsewhere. Furthermore, the average annual growth rate of the population below 
16 years of age in the 1995-2004 period has been -1.96 percent while its inequality-adjusted growth rate 
has been -1.64 percent. This implies a declining trend in the number of children in average household, but 
with  a  much  slower  decline  among  poor  households.  On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of  adults  in 
household shows an increasing trend. These findings suggest that cash transfer programmes relating to 
children can be further expanded because of the increase in the number of working population in Brazil. 
 
The situation is opposite in all aspects for the old-age group. The share in the total population is higher 
than  that  using  inequality-adjusted  weights  and  this  gap  has  increased  over  the  decade.  Inequality-
adjusted per capita elderly was represented 3.6 percent in average household in 1995. In the 1995-2004 
period, an annual growth rate of per capita elderly has been 1.66 percent against its inequality-adjusted 
growth rate of -0.67 percent. Overall, elderly population in Brazil is on the increase. This trend in turn 
puts pressure on the cash transfer programmes targeted at the elderly. The good news, however, is that the 
increase in elderly population among the poor appears to be slower than elderly among the non-poor. 
Hence,  sustainability  of  cash  transfer  programmes  for  elderly  in  the  long-term  calls  for  a  targeting 
strategy in such a way that poor elderly receive greater benefits from the programmes compared to non-
poor.  
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VIII.  Conclusions 
 
From the methodological point of view, this paper makes two important contributions to the literature. 
One contribution is its proposal for a new measure of pro-poor growth. This new measure provides the 
linkage between growth rates in the mean income and income inequality. In this sense, growth is defined 
as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in growth rate due to the decrease (or increase) in 
inequality. The other contribution is to develop a decomposition methodology exploring linkages between 
growth patterns and social policies. Through this decomposition, we assess the contribution of different 
non-labour income sources to growth patterns, with particular emphasis on the expansion of targeted cash 
transfers and devising more pro-poor social security benefits. These components are all translated into per 
capita growth in mean incomes and inequality adjusted incomes. The paper provides a growth and a pro-
poor growth account exercise. 
 
For empirical analysis, the study has used the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD) from 1995 
to 2004. The paper has analyzed the evolution of Brazilian social indicators based on per capita income 
exploring  links  with  adverse  labour  market  performance  and  social  policy  changes,  in  particular  the 
expansion of targeted cash transfers and devising more pro-poor social security benefits. The description 
of these social indicators depends on two main dimensions: i) who was affected by shocks perceived in 
the  labour  market  and  changes  observed  in  social  policies?  In  particular,  to  what  extent  did  these 
innovations affect more the poorest segments of the Brazilian society?; and ii) to what extent did the crisis 
affect labour income vs. other income sources such as official cash transfers, social security benefits or 
private incomes?  
 
The general answer to these questions is that labour earnings of the upper segments of Brazilian society 
were the epicentre of the economic crisis. Although per capita income fell during the 1995-2004 period, it 
cannot be referred to as a ‘poverty crisis’. While labour markets were quite adversely affected, incomes 
derived  from  social  security,  and  other  government  transfers  played  a  crucial  role  cushioning  the 
consequences of macro shocks observed, specifically among the poorest segments of Brazilian society. 
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Appendix: 
Shapely Decomposition to Explain Contributions of  
Income Components to Pro-Poor Growth 
 
Suppose there are four income components, which include: 
 
X1t: Per capita labour income at year t 
X2t:  Per capita social security income at year t 
X3t: Per capita cash transfers at year t 
X4t: Per capita non-social income at year t 
 
Total per capita income at year t is thus the sum of individual four income components. Thus we can 
write 
 
Xt = X1t + X2t + X3t + X4t    
 
Suppose log(x
*(Xt)) is the logarithm of social welfare at year t calculated on the basis of total per capita 
income Xt, which can be calculated from equation (14). Then the growth rate of social welfare at year t is 
given by 
 
)) ( log( )) ( log( 1
* * *
− − = t t t X x X x γ                                                                               (A.1) 
 
The Shapely decomposition can be used to calculate the contribution of each income component to the 
growth rate of social welfare of the total per capita income Xt as    
 










t γ γ γ γ γ + + + =                   (A.2) 
 
where ,  ) (
*
i t C γ ,where i varies from 1 to 4, is the contribution of the ith income component to growth rate 
of total welfare. Thus (A.1) is the proposed decomposition method which can be used to analyze the net 
contribution of each income component to growth rate of welfare. This equation can also be utilized to 
analyze  contributions  of  each  income  component  to  growth  in  total  inequality.  Using  the  Shapely 
decomposition, we  can  write the net  contribution of  each income component to  growth rate of total 
welfare as follows: 
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2 C and C C γ γ γ . Similar expressions Similarly, we can 
calculate the contribution of each income component to growth rate of total per capita income:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4 3 2 1 C C C C t t t t t γ γ γ γ γ + + + =             (A.3)  
 
Subtracting (A.3) from (A.2) gives the contribution of each income component to inequality of total per 
capita income.   
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